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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
EXCLUDABLE ALIENS: HISTORY PROVIDES A
REFUGE
The political traditions of the United States are steeped in the idea that
the powers of government should be subject to careful constraint. 1 Yet for
more than three decades, the Supreme Court has carved out an area in
which individuals may be subject to nearly unbridled governmental author-
ity without judicial remedy. The treatment received by two groups. of
immigrants who arrived on the southern shores of Florida brings into sharp
focus this contradiction in our traditions. The most renowned of the two
migrations occurred in the spring of 1980 aboard the "freedom flotilla"
which brought 125,000 Cuban nationals to our shore. 2 The other migration
occurred more gradually. Undocumented Haitians began to arrive in Flor-
ida in December 1972. By 1981 there were approximately 35,000 in the
region.3 Instead of freedom, many of the Cuban and Haitian immigrants
faced prolonged detention by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). 4 The incarceration of Cuban and Haitian refugees raised questions
regarding the extent of the federal government's power over excludable
aliens and the constitutional rights that those aliens might possess. 5
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that Congress and the
Executive have almost exclusive authority over decisions pertaining to the
admission or exclusion of aliens. 6 Although the Supreme Court has granted
1. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1315 (1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers) ("We have a
government of limited powers, and those limits pertain to the Justices of this Court as well as to
Congress and the Executive."); THE FEDERAISr No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("It
will not be denied that power is of an encroaching nature and that it ought to be effectually restrained
from passing the limits assigned to it.").
2. Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981).
3. Louis v. Nelson, 544F. Supp. 973,978 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'din part and rev'd inpart sub nom.
Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (lth Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
4. There are about 5,000 Cuban refugees being indefinitely detained in federal, state, or local
prisons. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 1. Several hundred of the Cuban refugees have spent up
to six years in federal prisons, not because of crimes committed in this country, but merely because the
INS deemed them to be excludable upon arrival. Id.
There are approximately seventy to eighty Haitian refugees currently being detained by the INS
nationwide. Sixty of those are being held at the Oakdale Louisiana Detention Center because they were
without documentation upon arrival in the United States. One hundred and one Haitian refugees were
returned to Haiti after the fall of President Jean-Claude Duvalier on February 7, 1986. Telephone
interview with Father Gerard Jean-Juste, Executive Director of the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami,
Florida (June 16, 1986).
5. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
6. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792 (1977). "This Court has repeatedly emphasized that 'over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of
aliens." Id. (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909));
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,769-70 (1972) ("[P]lenary congressional power to make policies
1449
Washington Law Review
deportable aliens some constitutional rights, excludable aliens have been
placed almost entirely at the mercy of Congress and the Executive, without
constitutional protection. 7 The prolonged detention of the Cuban and
Haitian refugees by the INS has produced a plethora of litigation challeng-
ing the Court's position. 8 Although the Supreme Court recently had the
opportunity to clarify questions regarding the extent of the government's
exclusion power and the constitutional rights of excludable aliens in Jean v.
Nelson, 9 it declined to do so and disposed of the appeal without ruling on
the constitutional issue. 10
This Comment will explore questions left unanswered by the Court in
Jean v. Nelson. In examining the scope of the government's exclusion
power and the constitutional position of the excludable alien, this Comment
proposes a new framework for analyzing the government's authority over
immigration law generally. The proposed framework consists of a two part
test which is based on a reexamination of two early Supreme Court
immigration decisions. The first prong of the test defines and limits the
scope of the government's plenary power over immigration through a
framework derived from Wong Wing v. United States." The second prong is
based on Kaoru Yamataya v. Fischer (The Japanese Immigrant Case)12 and
establishes constitutional limitations on the government's authority over
immigration even when exercised within the scope established under the
Wong Wing framework.
The proposed test reaches back beyond the past three decades of immi-
gration law to precedent which is more consistent with our political
traditions and the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. 13 The
decisions in Wong Wing and the Japanese Immigrant Case recognized that,
although the federal government has broad authority in the immigration
and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established."). See infra notes 31-52 and
accompanying text.
The plenary power over exclusion extends to both the executive and congressional branches. United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
7. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985); Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984);
Ferandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F2d 576 (1lth Cir. 1984); Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.
1982); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti,
515 F Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
9. 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
10. Jean, 105 S.Ct. at 2998-99.
11. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
12. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
13. See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1389-96 (1953), arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions
regarding the constitutional rights of excludable aliens during the 1950's were inconsistent with its
earlier constitutional jurisprudence and should be abandoned.
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field, its power is nevertheless subject to restrictions like any other govern-
mental power. Unfortunately, these decisions have been narrowly con-
strued. When examined in a broader context, Wong Wing and the Japanese
Immigrant Case provide an excellent framework for evaluating the govern-
ment's prerogative over immigration.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Cuban and Haitian Refugees
The incarceration by the INS of both the Cuban and Haitian refugees
raises important questions regarding the constitutional rights of excludable
aliens. However, the detention problems faced by the two groups differ
somewhat. The Cubans in detention face indefinite, potentially permanent
incarceration. 14 The INS determined that they are inadmissible and de-
tained them pending their return to Cuba. However, Cuba has refused to
permit their return.15 The Cuban immigrants argue that their indefinite
detention is without due process, and therefore, unconstitutional. 16
The plight of the Haitian refugees differs somewhat from that of the
Cubans. First, the Haitians challenging detention have not yet been deemed
excludable. 17 Furthermore, unlike the Cubans, the Haitian refugees could
return home if they desired. Haiti has not refused to accept them. 18
Consequently, Haitian refugees do not face indefinite incarceration in the
same way Cuban refugees do. 19 Rather, the Haitians claim that a new
14. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 102 (4th Cir. 1982); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654
F2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981); N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
15. In an agreement dated December 14, 1984, Cuba agreed to accept the return of 2746 of the
incarcerated refugees. However, in May, 1985, only five months after the agreement had been reached,
Fidel Castro abruptly cancelled it, protesting a decision by the Reagan Administration to begin sending
Cuban propaganda broadcasts over Radio Marti. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 1. Talks
between Cuba and the United States about reviving the immigration agreement are scheduled to
resume. Washington Post, July 4, 1986, at A24, col. 4.
16. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
17. Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 2995 (1985).
18. Unlike the Cuban refugees, the Haitian refugees in detention eventually will be released when
they are either granted asylum in this country or deported back to Haiti. However, the chances that a
Haitian refugee will be granted asylum in this country are slim. For an accounting of the many
difficulties that Haitian refugees have encountered in applying for asylum in the United States, see
Note, The Discrimination Against Haitian Aliens Seeking Asylum in the United States, 13 CUMB. L.
REv. 593 (1983).
19. Although the Haitian refugees technically could go back to Haiti at any time, many had feared
political persecution under the regime of President Jean-Claude Duvalier if they returned. Note, supra
note 18, at 608. It is still unclear how the recent political changes in Haiti will affect the practical or legal
positions of the Haitians. In February 1986, the repressive regime of President Jean-Claude Duvalier
collapsed and a military government assumed power. Seattle Times, Feb. 7, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
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detention/parole policy initiated by the INS in 1981 was applied to them in
a discriminatory fashion. They allege they were denied parole and detained
based on their race and national origin, and that their incarceration is an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection. 20
B. Distinguishing Excludable and Deportable Aliens
In United States immigration law there are important distinctions be-
tween excludable and deportable aliens.21 The judicially created "entry"
doctrine determines whether an alien will be classified as excludable or
deportable. 22 An alien who has "entered" the United States is subject to
deportation, not exclusion, proceedings. 23 An alien can accomplish an
"entry" into the United States either legally through a grant of admission,
or illegally through a clandestine border crossing. 24 By contrast, an ex-
cludable alien is one who is requesting admission, but who has not yet
Whether the new government will institute real political reform remains to be seen. Most Haitians are
adopting a wait-and-see attitude to determine the nature of the new regime and its attitudes regarding
political freedom or repression. Seattle Times, Feb. 9, 1986, at Al, col. 1; A 12, col. 1. One hundred and
one Haitian refugees applying for political asylum in the United States were deported back to Haiti
following the events of February 7, 1986. Telephone interview with Father Jean-Juste, supra note 4.
20. Jean, 105 S. Ct. at 2994-95. Since 1954, the government had followed a general policy of
parole for undocumented aliens who arrived on our shores seeking admission. Detention occurred only
in rare cases where the government determined that the alien was likely to abscond or that the alien's
release would be adverse to national security or public safety. This policy was praised by the Supreme
Court in Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958), as "reflect[ing] the humane qualities of an
enlightened civilization." During the first half of 1981, this general policy of parole came to an end.
Concerned about the number of Cuban and Haitian refugees arriving on south Florida shores, the
Attorney General ordered the INS to detain, without parole, any immigrant that could not present a
prima facie case for admission. Jean, 105 S. Ct. at 2995.
21. "Deportation" has two meanings. Substantively, it means the removal of aliens already within
the United States, as contrasted with the "exclusion" of aliens at the border seeking entry. "Deporta-
tion" may also refer to the procedural action of physically removing an alien from the country,
regardless of whether that alien is classified as "deportable" or "excludable." See United States ex rel.
Lue Chow Yee v. Shaughnessy, 146 F. Supp. 3, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1957).
See also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (although the word "deportation" is a term
of art, when used in the exclusion provisions of the INA it does not retain its technical gloss). The
distinction between the two usages of "deportation" is one the reader should bear in mind.
22. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), where the determination of whether or not an
alien had "entered" the United States was dispositive of whether the alien's right to remain in this
country would be adjudicated in exclusion or deportation proceedings.
23. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 25; Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
24. Garcia-Mir, 766 F.2d at 1484; Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185,187 (1958); Shaughnessy
v. United States exrel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,212 (1953). The fact that an alien has entered illegally does
not alter his or her position as within United States borders in the eyes of the Court. This has created a
peculiarity in the law with respect to the constitutional positions of excludable and deportable aliens:
undocumented aliens, classified as deportable, are entitled to greater constitutional and statutory
protections than excludable aliens. See infra and supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
1452
Constitutional Rights of Excludable Aliens
accomplished an "entry" into the United States.25 Physical presence within
the country is not enough to constitute an "entry." An alien requesting
admission is often physically within United States borders. However, from
a legal standpoint the alien remains constructively stopped at the border
outside of United States jurisdiction until granted admission. 26
The distinction between excludable and deportable aliens is crucial from
both a statutory and constitutional perspective.27 Under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), Congress has clearly separated the two groups
of aliens28 and granted deportable aliens important statutory rights that it
denied excludable aliens.29 In addition, the Supreme Court has granted
important constitutional due process rights to deportable aliens regarding
their right to remain in this country which it has denied to excludables
regarding their request for admission. 30
25. Garcia-Mir, 766 F2d at 1483-84.
26. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1924); Garcia-Mir, 766 F2d at 1484.
An alien requesting admission may be at a border crossing station just within United States territory.
He or she may have been paroled into the United States pending an admission hearing. The alien may
have been detained by the INS pending deportation after admission has been denied. Nevertheless, the
Court views all these aliens to be outside United States borders. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185,
188, 190 (1957); Shaughnessy v. United States exrel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,215 (1953); United States v.
Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 661 (1892).
27. In discussing the distinctions between excludable and deportable aliens the Supreme Court has
stated:
It is important to note at the outset that our immigration laws have long made a distinction
between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission. . . and those who are
within the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance the Court
has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who
are merely "on the threshold of initial entry.". . The distinction was carefully preserved in Title
II of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (citations omitted).
28. The INS must determine whether an alien is to be admitted or excluded in accordance with
sections 231-240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1230 (1982)
(provisions relating to entry and exclusion). However, the right of a deportable alien to remain in this
country is determined under sections 241-244 of the INA. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1254 (1982) (provisions
relating to deportation).
29. Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1982), and
Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1975), for an enumeration of some of the
differences in statutory rights between excludable and deportable aliens.
30. Once an alien has entered this country either legally or illegally, the alien is entitled to the full
protection of due process under the fifth amendment before he or she can be deported. Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,212 (1953). However, the Court has repeatedly denied these
same due process rights to excludable aliens. The Court insists that any procedure devised by Congress
to handle the exclusion of aliens is due process as far as the excludable alien is concerned. Id.
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C. Historical Development of the Exclusion Power
For nearly a century, the Supreme Court has insisted that the govern-
ment's plenary power over exclusion includes the determination of both the
substantive and procedural criteria for entry.31 The government's authority
to establish the substantive standards for exclusion was initially announced
by the Court in 1889 in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case).32 In Ekiu v. United States, 33 the Supreme Court extended
the government's plenary control over exclusion to include procedural
restrictions on admission. 34 The Court declared that it was not the province
of the judiciary to overturn the constitutional and lawful actions of the
legislative and executive branches regarding exclusion. 35
Although few, if any, restrictions have ever been placed on the govern-
ment's control over the substantive conditions of entry, the Court has been
less consistent in the procedural sphere.36 Early in this century, the Court
apparently began to take a more generous view of the procedural rights of
excludable aliens. This relaxation began when the Court ruled that "aliens"
at the border claiming United States citizenship were entitled to a fair
hearing. In these situations the judiciary could examine the administrative
proceedings for abuse of discretion or to ensure fairness. 37 Procedural
protections were soon extended to exclusion hearings in general. 38
31. Developments in the Law: Immigration Policy and the Rights ofAliens, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1286,
1312-13 (1983).
32. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The Chinese Exclusion Case involved the exclusion of an alien on the
basis of race. Although the Supreme Court ruled that there is no constitutional violation where the
government seeks to exclude aliens on the basis of race, the INA statutorily prohibits discrimination
based on either race or national origin in exclusion proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1982).
Although many of the substantive classifications which Congress applies to aliens would be
constitutionally doubtful if applied to citizens, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 (1976), the Supreme
Court has repeatedly upheld these classifications when applied to aliens seeking admission. For
example, apart from race, the Court has also countenanced exclusions based on sexual preference,
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967), and political philosophy, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972).
33. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
34. The Court held that the decisions of executive officers to grant or deny admission were due
process as far as the excludable alien was concerned. Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660. See also Kleindienst, 408
U.S. at 766; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1894). But see Martin, Due Process
and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PIrT. L. REv. 165,
173-74 (1983). Professor Martin takes issue with the Court's interpretation ofEkiu. He argues that Ekiu
does not stand for the proposition that excludable aliens are without procedural due process protections.
Rather, he maintains that the issue decided in Ekiu was the forum required by due process, not whether
due process principles applied at all.
35. Eiku, 142 U.S. at 660.
36. See Hart, supra note 13, at 1390-91, where Professor Hart details the Supreme Court's early
expansion of procedural protections in both exclusion and deportation proceedings.
37. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 457 (1920).
38. See Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335-36 (1932), for a summary of the early
procedural protections that were provided to an alien in exclusion proceedings.
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After this initial broadening of procedural protections for excludable
aliens, the Court faced the issue once again in the early 1950's. The
Department of Justice had begun to exclude aliens who were deemed
subversives without permitting the aliens an opportunity to refute the
accusations. Whenever the information underlying the exclusion order was
classified as prejudicial to the public interest, the Department of Justice
claimed the authority to refuse disclosure and deny the alien a hearing. 39
When confronted with this challenge, the direction of the Court changed
dramatically. It reasserted the government's complete plenary authority
over the procedural aspects of exclusion. Two cases, in particular, are
associated with this shift: United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy4O and
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei.41 In these decisions, the Court
relied on the earliest exclusion decisions for its authority42 and apparently
ignored the expansion of procedural due process rights for excludables that
had occurred in the early 1900's. Language from Knauff and Mezei has
been used by the government to argue that aliens detained at the border are
completely devoid of constitutional rights.43 The decision in Mezei was
even more severe than Knauff because Mezei resulted not only in the alien
being denied admission, but in his indefinite incarceration as well.44
39. See United States exrel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,541,542 n.3 (1950); Martin,
supra note 34, at 165-66.
40. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Knauff involved the exclusion of an alien war bride. Id. at 539. The
Department of Justice claimed her admission would be prejudicial to the public interest and refused to
grant her a hearing or disclose the basis of its exclusion order. Id. The Court declared that "[w]hatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as the alien denied entry is concerned."
Id. at 544. Furthermore, the Court made clear that, unless authorized by statute, it was not the province
of the judiciary to review the determination of the political branches of the government to exclude an
alien. Id. at 543.
41. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Like Knauff, Mezei also involved the exclusion of an alien who was
declared to be a security risk by the Department of Justice based on confidential information. Id. at 208.
Mezei had been a resident alien in the United States for 25 years. In 1948, he traveled to Eastern Europe
to see his dying mother. When he attempted to return to his home in New York, the Department of
Justice labeled him a security risk. Id. They refused to permit his admission or provide for a hearing on
the grounds that revealing the basis of the exclusion order would be adverse to the interests of the United
States. Id.
42. For example, Knauff relies heavily on Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), and Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); the latter is a deportation case but contains extensive
discussions of the power to exclude. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542, 543,544. Mezei also relies heavily on
Ekiu. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212, 213, 215.
43. Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 3006 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209. After the Department asserted that Mezei's admission would be
adverse to the interests of this country, other countries were unwilling to accept him. Id. at 208-09.
Therefore, the Department of Justice was unable to deport Mezei. At the time of the decision, Mezei
had been incarcerated for 21 months with no end in sight. Id. at 209.
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Jackson stated that:
Government counsel ingeniously argued that Ellis Island is his [Mezei's] 'refuge' whence he is
free to take leave in any direction except west. That might mean freedom, if only he were an
amphibian! Realistically, this man is incarcerated by a combination of forces which keep him as
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Knauff and Mezei reasserted the government's nearly exclusive control
over exclusion. 45 Contrary to prior developments, the judiciary was left
with little, if any, role in the admission process. 46 The doctrine has been
severely criticized by both academic 47 and judicial authorities. 48 Although
there have been recent indications that the Supreme Court may be re-
evaluating the validity of the doctrine, 49 it has not yet been repudiated. 50
The detention of Cuban and Haitian excludables in the present decade has
once again focused attention on the doctrine of the government's plenary
power over excludable aliens. The validity of this doctrine in the 1980's,
however, remains unclear because of conflicting lower court decisions 51
and the recent refusal of the Supreme Court to rule on the issue in Jean v.
Nelson.52
effectually as a prison, the dominant and proximate of these forces being the United States
immigration authority. It overworks legal fiction to say that one is free in law when by the
commonest of common sense he is bound.
Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the practical
realities of Mezei's situation or to grant him any relief. Citing Knauff the Court sanctioned Mezei's
exclusion and indefinite incarceration without a hearing. 345 U.S. at 214-15.
45. The government has argued that Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953), contains
further support for its view that aliens detained at the border can claim no fifth amendment due process
rights. The government asserts that by stating in Chew that a permanent resident alien is a "person"
within the protection of the fifth amendment, id. at 596, the Supreme Court implies that an excludable
alien is not. See Jean v. Nelson, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 3006-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (summarizing and
then rejecting the government's analysis of Chew).
46. The government has argued that Knauff and Mezei preclude any constitutional protections for
excludable aliens. See supra notes 43, 45 and accompanying text. But see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
793 n.5 (1977), which, contrary to the arguments of the Attorney General in that case, indicated the
existence of at least minimal judicial review.
47. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 13, at 1386-96; Martin, supra note 34, at 173-80.
48. See. e.g., Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 218 (Jackson, J., dissenting);
Jean, 105 S. Ct. at 2999 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), which dealt with the exclusion of a resident alien
who was returning from a brief trip to Mexico which involved an attempt to smuggle aliens across the
border. The Court ruled that the alien was entitled to due process at her exclusion hearing. Id. at 32. The
Court admitted that in Mezei it had rejected the argument that a returning resident alien was entitled to
due process. It attempted to distinguish Mezei on the seemingly weak ground that Plasencia's absence
from the United States had been for a much shorter period than Mezei's. Id. at 33-34. Therefore,
although the scope of Mezei was left undecided, Plasencia appears to be a small crack in the doctrinal
wall. Developments, supra note 31, at 1319-20 (1983).
50. In fact, in recent years the Supreme Court has noted both Knauff and Mezei with apparent
approval. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,762
(1972).
51. Compare Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1982) (recognizing
procedural due process rights for excludable aliens in dicta) with Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th
Cir. 1982) (denying that excludables may claim due process rights under the Constitution).
52. 105 S. Ct. 2992 (1985).
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D. Rationales Underlying the Government's Plenary Power Over
Exclusion
Over the years, the Supreme Court has delineated three distinct
rationales on which to base the doctrine of the government's unconstrained
plenary power over exclusion.53 The first rationale is based on the distinc-
tion between a "right" and a "privilege." An alien who seeks admission to
the United States is in the position of requesting a privilege, not asserting a
right.54 Therefore, the government argues that it can grant or deny this
privilege under any conditions it sees fit to impose.55 The second rationale
is founded on the idea that the power of the Constitution does not extend
beyond our borders. Because the Court adheres to the legal fiction that
excludable aliens are legally positioned outside United States borders, it
considers excludables to be beyond the protective reach of the Constitu-
tion.56 Because the first two justifications focus on the idea that the status or
position of the alien obviates any check on the government's power to
exclude, they are limited in scope. Where the petitioner is not within the
required status or position, the first two rationales do not apply. Therefore,
they cannot explain all of the Court's decisions regarding the government's
exclusion authority.57
The third rationale is based on the theory that the nature and source of the
government's exclusion authority places that authority beyond constitu-
tional restraint. 58 This power-based rationale focuses not on the position of
the alien, but on the nature of the government's authority. Therefore, unlike
the first two rationales, this rationale operates whenever the government
exercises its exclusion power.59 Because it is the most significant and
53. The primary rationales underlying the government's plenary power were first delineated and
analyzed in Note, ConstitutionalLimits on the Powerto ExcludeAliens, 82 CoLuM. L. REv. 957 (1982).
See also Developments, supra note 31, at 1314-22.
54. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32; United States ew rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 542 (1950).
55. For a detailed analysis and critique of the use of the right/privilege distinction as a rationale for
the government's plenary power over exclusion, see Note, supra note 53, at 975-77, and Developments,
supra note 31, at 1318-20, where the commentators argue that the use of the right/privilege distinction
in the immigration field should be abandoned.
56. For a detailed analysis and critique of the Court's territorial rationale for the government's
plenary exclusion authority, see Note, supra note 53, at 978-82, and Developments, supra note 31, at
1320-22, where the commentators argue that this rationale is inconsistent with the Court's reasoning in
a variety of other situations where it held, without hesitation, that the Constitution operates extrater-
ritorially to protect individual rights. See also Comment, The Constitutional Rights of Excludable
Aliens: Proposed Limitations on the Indefinite Detention of Cuban Refugees, 70 Gao. L.J. 1303, 1323
(1982).
57. Note, supra note 53, at 965-66, 975.
58. Id. at 965.
59. Id. at 966, 975.
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comprehensive of the Court's rationales, it should be addressed in greater
detail.
Nothing in the text of the Constitution expressly confers on the federal
government the power to exclude aliens. 60 However, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly asserted that the government possesses this power as one inher-
ent in sovereignty. 61 By describing the power to exclude as one that flows
directly from sovereignty rather than a constitutional grant, the Court
attempts to rationalize an unlimited power, beyond constitutional re-
straint.62
The power-based rationale for the government's plenary authority over
exclusion has been criticized as an aberration in the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence on several grounds. First, it is inconsistent with the natural
law theory of the Bill of Rights. 63 The Bill of Rights is not a governmental
grant of rights, but rather is a written recognition of some of the individual
rights that exist in nature, independent of any governmental authority or
document. 64 Therefore, the Bill of Rights is a limit on the exercise of all
government power whether derived from the text of the Constitution or, in
the case of the government's immigration authority, derived independently
of the Constitution. 65
Second, the Executive's foreign affairs power, like the exclusion power,
has also been characterized as one inherent in sovereignty. 66 However,
unlike the exclusion power, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its
willingness to subject the foreign affairs power to the constitutional limita-
tions in the Bill of Rights. 67
The third criticism relates to the inconsistency between the constitu-
tional rights the Court has granted to deportable aliens and those granted to
excludable aliens. This inconsistency exists despite the Court's assertion of
unity between the power to exclude and the power to expel. 68 If the two
60. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); Developments, supra
note 31, at 1315.
61. See, e.g., Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895);Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-07 (1893); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Developments, supra note 31, at 1315.
62. For a more detailed discussion, see Note, supra note 53, at 966-69.
63. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see Note, supra note 53, at 971-74.
64. Id. at 972.
65. Id. at 972-73.
66. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); Note, supra note 53,
at 967-68.
67. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1963).
For a detailed discussion of examples where the Court has subjected the Executive's foreign affairs
power io constitutional limitations, see Note, supra note 53, at 973-74.
68. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893), the Court initially declared
that: "The power to exclude aliens, and the power to expel them, rest upon one foundation, are derived
from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the same
1458
Vol. 61:1449, 1986
Constitutional Rights of Excludable Aliens
powers rest upon the same foundation, then logically the power to expel
should be just as immune from constitutional limitation and judicial scru-
tiny as the power to exclude. However, Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher (The
Japanese Immigrant Case)69 has been traditionally interpreted as limiting
the government's power to expel by extending due process rights to depor-
table aliens prior to expulsion. 70 Despite the fact that the Court has based
the government's immigration authority over deportation on sovereignty
and not an explicit constitutional grant, the Court still found that the
deportation authority was subject to constitutional limitation. 71 Therefore,
the fact that the power to exclude is likewise grounded on sovereignty
should not bar constitutional limitations.
Finally, an unrestrained exclusion power stands in direct conflict with a
number of limitations the Court has placed on the power to exclude. First, the
Court has held that the Constitution forbids the government from enforcing
its immigration policies by subjecting excludable aliens to punishment at
hard labor.72 Second, despite the firm assertion in the Immigration and
Nationality Act that the decision of executive officers regarding the exclu-
sion of aliens is final, 73 the Courthas longrecognized review of the immigra-
tion official's decision through habeas corpus proceedings. 74 Finally, the
Court's assertion that the sovereign exclusion power is without constitu-
tional limitation cannot be squared with many of its early decisions which
granted excludable aliens some procedural due process protections. 75
power." Id. The right to expel or deport foreigners who have not naturalized or taken steps towards
becoming citizens of the country rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute as the right to prohibit
and prevent their entrance into this country. Id. at 707.
Throughout the development of immigration law, the Court has never waivered from the assertion
that the power to expel and to exclude are derived from the same source. In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787
(1976), the Court stated: "Our cases have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a
fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune
from judicial control. . . .Our recent decisions have not departed from this long-established rule."
Id. at 792 (citations omitted).
69. 189 U.S. 86(1903).
70. Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 101.
71. For a more thorough discussion of this argument, seeDevelopments, supra note 31, at 1315-16.
72. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). Although Wong Wing was a
deportation case, it applies with equal force in the exclusion setting. It explicitly refers to both
deportation and exclusion. Id. at 237. Furthermore, Wong Wing was decided prior to The'Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), which marked the point vhen the Court began to consider the
power to exclude separately from the power to deport. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. In
addition, the Tenth Circuit has applied Wong Wing while reasoning that the indefinite detention of
excludable aliens is impermissible punishment and violative of the fifth amendment. Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387 (1981).
73. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1982).
74. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
75. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.





The concept of the government's plenary power over excludable aliens as
expounded by the Court since the 1950's has been severely criticized in
both academic 76 and judicial forums. 77 Its development was an historical
aberration78 and the rationales used to justify the power's breadth and lack
of constitutional restraint are inadequate. 79 It should be abandoned.
If the doctrine of plenary power as elaborated today is abandoned, then
the Court must find an adequate replacement. Any new proposal to restruc-
ture the government's power over exclusion will undoubtedly entail far-
reaching changes throughout immigration law. However, the Court need
not create an entirely new doctrine to fill the void. The foundations for a
sound immigration doctrine, consistent with our political traditions and the
Court's constitutional jurisprudence, had already been formed early in this
century. The Court has only to reexamine existing but neglected prece-
dents. Two decisions in particular, Wong Wing v. United States80 and Kaoru
Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case)81 provide excellent
guidance in the search for a rational immigration doctrine. Reevaluation of
these cases reveals a sound structure that can be utilized in defining the
government's immigration authority and its limitations.
The structure that can be derived from Wong Wing and the Japanese
Immigrant Case consists of a two part test. First, the Court's decision in
Wong Wing provides a framework for defining the scope of the govern-
ment's plenary power over immigration. Under this framework, a narrow
range of specific immigration actions fall within the core of the govern-
ment's plenary authority and are, therefore, ordinarily subject to minimal
judicial review. However, immigration actions not within the core of the
government's plenary authority are subject to a higher level of judicial
scrutiny. The second portion of the test is based on the Japanese Immigrant
Case and requires the government to act in accord with fifth amendment
due process requirements if the government's actions affect an alien's
liberty interest. 82 This second criteria applies regardless of whether the
government's action falls within or outside the core of its immigration
authority as defined by the Wong Wing framework. It is the only exception
76. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
80. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
81. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
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to the standard of minimal judicial review for actions which fall within the
core of the government's plenary power.
A.. Wong Wing and the Scope of the Government's Exclusion Authority
One of the primary deficiencies in Supreme Court discussions of the
government's plenary power over exclusion is the Court's failure to analyze
the scope of the power. In evaluating the scope of the government's
exclusion authority three issues must be addressed. The threshold issue is
the validity of the Court's assumption that there can be no judicial review of
government action when the government purports to be exercising its
plenary authority over exclusion. Once the propriety of judicial review is
established, the second issue to examine is when heightened review is
appropriate. Finally, the last issue involves determining the precise level of
scrutiny to be employed when the judiciary reviews government action
toward excludable aliens.
1. The Foundations of Judicial Review
If there is no judicial review of the government's power over immigra-
tion, the government would be able to promote any policy or take any
action toward excludable aliens that it desired. Yet common sense and
judicial precedent indicate that there must be some limit beyond which the
government exceeds its broad exclusion authority and its actions become
subject to judicial review and limitation.
In his dissent to Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, Justice
Jackson used common sense to criticize the Court's failure to establish
limits on the scope of the government's exclusion power.83 He queried
whether the government's plenary power over exclusion included actions
such as ejecting an alien into the sea or confiscating all of an alien's
valuables. Certainly, these actions would promote the government's ability
to exclude. Yet, Justice Jackson believed the Supreme Court would inter-
vene and condemn such actions as the deprivation of life or the taking of
property without due process. 84
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent indicates that government actions
need not be as outrageous as those suggested by Justice Jackson to exceed the
scope of the government's plenary power and induce judicial scrutiny. Even
before the turn of the century, in Wong Wing v. UnitedStates, 85 the Court had
83. Shaughnessy v. United States exrel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,216 (1953) (Jackson, J, dissenting).
84. Id. at 226-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
85. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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begun to review government actions in the immigration area and define the
scope of the government's plenary authority. In Wong Wing, a Chinese alien
challenged the constitutionality of an act which provided that prior to depor-
tation all persons of Chinese descent found to be illegally within the United
States were to be imprisoned at hard labor for up to one year. 86 The act
provided that the decision to imprison the alien was to be made entirely by
executive officers without judicial trial. 87 The government sought to justify
the statute as within its plenary power over immigration. The Court, how-
ever, struck the statute down. 88 Wong Wing, therefore, indicates that
although the Court described the government's power over immigration as
"plenary," there is a role for judicial review in immigration matters when
government action exceeds the scope of its plenary authority.89
In Mezei, the Court ignored the precedential authority of Wong Wing.
Wong Wing involved a challenge to a statute thatpermitted the government to
imprison aliens at hard labor prior to deportation. 90 Mezei also involved the
authority of the government to incarcerate an alien prior to deportation. 91
Therefore, of all the precedent available to the Court, Wong Wing would
appear to be the closest on point. Yet Mezei never mentions Wong Wing.
The Mezei Court may have ignored Wong Wing for two reasons, neither
of which will withstand close scrutiny. First, the aliens involved in Wong
Wing were deportable, not excludable. 92 As previously noted, the rights of
these two groups can vary dramatically. 93 Therefore, at first glance, it
appears that the Mezei Court had a valid reason for ignoring Wong Wing.
However, at the time Wong Wing was decided the Supreme Court did not
make constitutional distinctions between deportable and excludable aliens.
Distinctions between the two groups did not arise until after Kaoru
Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case)94 which was decided
some years later.95 Therefore, Wong Wing should apply with equal force in
86. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).
87. Id at 237.
88. Id. at 237-38. Despite its many statements that the government may exercise its immigration
authority without judicial interference, the Court found this immigration law in violation of the fifth and
sixth amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 238.
89. In addition, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text, discussing other early immigration
decisions where the Court has claimed a limited role for the judiciary in reviewing government
exclusion determinations.
90. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 235.
91. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953).
92. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 229.
93. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
94. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). The Japanese Immigrant Case was the first to grant due process rights to
aliens in deportation proceedings.
95. Developments, supra note 31, at 1316 n.20.
The Wong Wing Court's lengthy analysis of Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895),
supports the conclusion that Wong Wing did not distinguish between deportable and excludable aliens.
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either deportation or exclusion settings.
The second reason the Mezei Court may have overlooked Wong Wing is
that Wong Wing has been narrowly construed as standing solely for the
proposition that the criminal prosecution or punishment of any alien
without judicial trial is unconstitutional. 96 Mezei, however, involved a
deportation which was incident to an exclusion order. Deportation, no
matter how severe its consequences, has always been classified by the
Court as a civil, not a criminal action. 97 Because Mezei's incarceration was
arguably incident to his order of deportation and not a punishment specifi-
cally legislated by Congress, the Court in Mezei may have believed that
Wong Wing was inapplicable.
Despite the apparent criminal/civil distinction, Wong Wing is applicable
to the situation faced in Mezei. One may accept the Court's definition of
deportation as a civil rather than criminal action, and therefore, accept the
validity of temporary confinement withoutjudicial trial in order to facilitate
an exclusion or expulsion order. However, accepting the validity of tempo-
rary confinement does not mean that any imprisonment the government
sees fit to impose on excludables is valid so long as the government couches
it in civil and not criminal terms. Wong Wing specifically forbids the
punishment of aliens without a trial. 98 The government should not be able
to do what Wong Wing specifically forbids, merely by categorizing its
action as civil, rather than criminal. The issue faced in both Wong Wing and
Wang Wing, 163 U.S. at 232-33. Lem Moon Sing dealt with an excludable alien, 158 U.S. at 539-40,
while Wong Wing involved deportable aliens. The distinction was unimportant to the Court because at the
time Wang Wing was decided, the Court viewed the government's power to exclude or expel as one and the
same. Fong YueTing v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,707,713-14 (1893). Wang Wing, therefore, should
apply with equal authority in either an exclusion or a deportation setting. In fact, both the Tenth and Fifth
Circuits have recognized that it applies with equal force to deportable and excludable aliens, at least in
terms of the narrow holding in Wang Wing that the government may not punish an alien without con-
forming to the due process guarantees of the fifth amendment. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654
F.2d 1382, 1387 n.3 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908,913 (5th Cir. 1979).
96. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.9 (1952); Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S.
486,495 (1901). Subsequent to Mezei, Wang Wing continued to be cited for its narrow proposition. Jean
v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 3007 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 n.17 (1979) (subjection of persons to punishment at hard labor must be preceded by judicial
trial to establish guilt).
97. Carlson v. Landon, 345 U.S. 524, 537 (1952); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 594;
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
98. Wang Wing, 163 U.S. at 237. Moreover, the only confinement expressly approved in Wang
Wing was one that was temporary and necessary in order to give effect to an exclusion or deportation
order. Id. at 235. The confinement in Mezei, however, was of indefinite, potentially permanent,
duration. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 217 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Further-
more, the confinement could not be justified as necessary in order to give effect to an exclusion order
because the order was unenforceable. For all practical purposes, the order was defunct. See supra note




Mezei was the extent of the government's authority to imprison an alien
without due process, regardless of whether the action was categorized as
civil or criminal. The Mezei Court, therefore, should have considered Wong
Wing in its analysis. If it had, immigration law may not have taken the
course it has since the 1950's.
2. Determining When the Government Has Exceeded the Scope of Its
Plenary Authority and Heightened Judicial Review Is Appropriate:
The Wong Wing Framework
Contrary to the idea advanced in Mezei, Wong Wing holds that the
government's power to exclude does not extend to any and all action the
government might take toward excludables. At some point government
action goes beyond the scope of its plenary power. When it does, the
judiciary must step in to review the government's action and, if appropri-
ate, invalidate it. Wong Wing stands for far more than is implied by the
narrow construction it has traditionally been given. Wong Wing provides a
framework for discerning when government action is within the scope of its
plenary power and when it has passed beyond that scope.
In Wong Wing, the Court reaffirmed the plenary power of Congress to
define the terms and conditions under which aliens may enter or remain in
this country, to exclude or deport aliens that fail to meet those terms, and to
commit the enforcement of these policies to executive officers. 99 Wong
Wing did not challenge those tenets, but presented a new problem. Accord-
ing to the Court:
The question now presented is whether Congress can promote its policy in
respect to Chinese persons by adding to its provisions for their exclusion and
expulsion punishment by imprisonment at hard labor, to be inflicted by the
judgment of any justice, judge, or commissioner of the United States without
a trial by jury. 100
For the first time, therefore, the Court faced the issue of the scope of the
government's plenary authority over immigration.
A framework for defining the scope of the government's plenary power
can be drawn from the Court's decision in Wong Wing. The Court drew a
line between government actions aimed specifically at the exclusion or
expulsion of aliens and those which reach beyond exclusion or expulsion.
The Court stated, " [t]here is. . . a distinction between those provisions of
99. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). "The power of Congress to exclude aliens
altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come
into this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive
officers, without judicial intervention, is settled . Id. at 233.
100. Id. at 235.
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the statute which contemplate only the exclusion or expulsion of Chinese
persons and those which provide for their imprisonment at hard labor
"101
The Court specifically approved a narrow range of three core immigra-
tion actions as within the scope of the government's plenary power and,
therefore, subject to limited judicial review. First, the Court reiterated the
constitutional validity of legislation calling for the exclusion or expulsion
of certain classes of immigrants. 102 Therefore, under the proposed frame-
work, Congress would continue to have nearly complete discretion under
its plenary authority regarding the substantive determinations of exclusion
or expulsion. Second, the Wong Wing Court protected the government's
procedural power to deport aliens in order to enforce exclusion or expulsion
orders. 103 Finally, the Court included the temporary confinement of aliens
within the government's plenary authority, where that confinement is
necessary to accomplish the deportation. 104
The three core immigration actions approved in Wong Wing as within the
government's plenary authority relate specifically to exclusion or expulsion
and are essential to the government's interest in controlling the nation's
borders. The Wong Wing Court's decision to scrutinize closely the govern-
ment's policy of imprisoning aliens prior to deportation indicates that the
scope of the core actions is to be narrowly construed. Certainly, the
challenged action promoted the government's policy of discouraging the
immigration or settlement of Chinese nationals. However, imprisonment
for one year at hard labor prior to deportation did more than contemplate
the mere exclusion or expulsion of aliens. When the government attempted
to promote its immigration policy through actions that went beyond the
core of its immigration authority, the Court found those actions to be
subject to its power of review and limited them accordingly. 105 The Court
stated that "when Congress sees fit to further promote [its immigration]
policy by subjecting. . . aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or
101. Id. at 236.
102. Id. at 230-33 (reviewing previous challenges to legislation requiring the exclusion or
expulsion of aliens and affirming the constitutionality of such legislation).
103. We regard it as settled by our previous decisions that the United States can, as a matter of
policy, by Congressional enactment, forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their
borders, and expel aliens from their territory, and can, in order to make effectual such decree of
exclusion or expulsion, devolve the power and duty of identifying and arresting the persons
included in such decree, and causing their deportation, upon executive or subordinate officials.
Id. at 237.
104. Id. at 235 ("We think it clear that detention or temporary confinement, as part of the means
necessary to give effect to the provisions for excluiion or expulsion of aliens would be valid.").
105. Id. at 237.
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by confiscating their property, we think such legislation, to be valid, must
provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused." 106
If there is to be a meaningful limit on the government's plenary power
over immigration, the framework derived from Wong Wing must be nar-
rowly drawn. Government actions which go beyond the three areas which
the Wong Wing framework designates as within the government's plenary
power should be subject to judicial scrutiny. The Court adequately ensured
the government's ability to protect United States borders, by granting the
government plenary authority with minimal judicial scrutiny in the sub-
stantive determination of who may enter and who may remain in the United
States, and by likewise approving the government's power to deport and
temporarily detain aliens to enforce those substantive determinations.
Because the Court has adequately provided for the government's legitimate
interest in protecting our borders, it is appropriate that actions beyond the
core approved in Wong Wing should be subject to a higher level of judicial
scrutiny than those actions within the core. Of course, this does not mean
that the government is precluded from furthering an immigration policy by
pursuing actions outside its plenary authority. It simply means that those
actions, like most governmental actions, would be subject to the Court's
review. 107
In Mezei, the Court completely ignored the framework that can be
derived from Wong Wing. In fact, it failed to recognize any perimeters on
the scope of the government's exclusion power. Because of this, it might be
argued that Mezei overruled Wong Wing. Yet, Wong Wing continues to be
cited with favor. 108 Mezei, on the other hand, has been the object of
widespread criticism. 109 The Supreme Court should accept the criticism
that Mezei has received and reject its doctrine, which permits the govern-
ment to exercise nearly unbridled power over excludable aliens. 110
106. Id. Although the statute would have furthered the government's immigration policies regard-
ing Chinese aliens, this was not enough to justify the action, place it within the government's plenary
authority, or permit it to escape judicial scrutiny. The Court held the government's action to be
unconstitutional. Id. at 237-38.
107. In Wong Wing, the Court implied that although the government's actions were not within the
scope of its plenary power over immigration, it would be possible for the government to promote its
immigration policy through legislation which provided for the imprisonment of aliens. However, the
Court made clear that this type of legislation would be subject to judicial review. The Court determined
that in order for the legislation to be valid, provisions for judicial trial were necessary. Id. at 237.
108. Rodriguez-Fernandezv. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382,1386-87 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 913 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 3007 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (subjection of persons to
punishment at hard labor must be preceded by judicial trial to establish guilt).
109. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
110. If the Supreme Court does not abandon Mezei, the very least it should do is adopt a narrow
reading which would limit Mezei to a confined set of circumstances. This is the course argued by Justice
Marshall in his dissent to Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992,3005,3007 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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3. Determining the Appropriate Level of Judicial Review for Actions
Which Fall Outside the Core of the Government's Plenary Power
Over Immigration
After determining that there should be increased judicial scrutiny of
action which falls outside the scope of the government's plenary power
under the Wong Wing framework, the next issue to address is the precise
level of heightened judicial scrutiny that is appropriate. Because the courts
have refused to review federal action toward excludable aliens, there is no
judicial precedent directly on point. However, the Supreme Court has been
willing to review state action toward aliens. The structure of the Court's
analysis in this area can be used as an instructive analogy in determining the
appropriate level ofjudicial scrutiny when the federal government's actions
toward aliens fall outside its plenary power as defined by the Wong Wing
framework.
State governments do not stand in the same position as the federal
government regarding aliens. They do not possess plenary power over
matters of immigration."1 State laws regarding aliens are sometimes
invalidated, in part because the federal government's immigration power is
said to be so pervasive that state governments are preempted from acting in
the area.112 Because of this fundamental difference, decisions reviewing
state action toward aliens should not be directly applied to federal action.
However, analogies can be drawn between the structure of the Court's
analysis regarding the level of review to be applied to state actions involv-
ing aliens and the level of review that should be applied to federal actions.
In recent years, the structure of the Court's analysis regarding the level of
judicial review that is appropriate when state legislation discriminates on
the basis of alienage has fallen into two lines of cases. The first subjects
discrimination by the state to a strict level of scrutiny. For example, in
Graham v. Richardson113 the Court dealt with the power of the state to
retain certain economic benefits for its citizens by denying those same
benefits to otherwise-qualified resident aliens. The Court applied a strict
Justice Marshall argues that the narrow question addressed in both United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953), was whether the denial of a hearing regarding exclusion or parole violates due process where the
government raises national security concerns. Jean, 105 S. Ct. at 3007 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall noted that broad dicta from these two decisions could be used to support a lack of
restraint on the government's authority over excludables. However, he argued that these dicta are
contrary to logic and principle, and should be ignored. Id. at 3005 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,42 (1915) ("The authority to control immigration-to admit or
exclude aliens-is vested solely in the Federal Government."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
112. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971).
113. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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level of scrutiny and held that the state could not constitutionally dis-
tinguish between aliens and citizens in the distribution of state welfare
benefits. 114
Since Graham, however, the Court has distinguished between the econ-
omic and sovereign functions of state governments. 115 The Court has
determined that although citizenship is not a relevant factor in the distribu-
tion of economic benefits, it is relevant in determining membership in the
political community. 116 The Court has recognized that a state has a funda-
mental, sovereign interest in limiting governmental decision-making and
participation to citizens, and has acknowledged a state's broad authority to
do so without judicial interference. 117 The state's interest applies not only
to voter qualification, but also to elective or important nonelective govern-
mental offices that participate in the formulation or execution of broad
public policy or which "go to the heart of representative government." 118
Therefore, legislation which excludes aliens from positions intimately
related to the process of democratic self-government need only pass a
rational basis test. 119
However, the Court has not abandoned the Graham rule. When a state
discriminates against aliens and the discrimination does not involve the
state's interest in protecting political participation, then the Graham rule of
increased scrutiny applies.120 Indeed, the Court has been careful not to
permit the government to rely upon the political participation justification
when its actions fall beyond this interest. For example, the Court has
rejected the argument that the state is exercising its sovereign right to
protect participation in political processes when it restricts aliens from
positions as attorneys, 121 civil engineers, 122 and notaries public. 123 In all of
these decisions, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the statutes and invali-
dated them. 124
114. Graham, 403 U.S. at 375-76.
115. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 438 (1982).
116. Id.; Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296
(1977).
117. Bernal v. Fainter, 104S. Ct. 2312,2317 (1984);Cabell, 454U.S. at438-40;Ambach. 441 U.S.
at 74-75; Foley 435 U.S. at 295-96; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642-43,647-48 (1973).
118. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 74 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
119. Bernal, 104 S. Ct. at 2316;Ambach, 441 U.S. at 74; Foley, 435 U.S. at 295-96.
The Court has approved citizenship requirements for probation officers, Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432 (1982), public school teachers, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), and state
troopers, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1977).
120. Cabell, 454 U.S. at 439.
121. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
122. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
123. Bernal v. Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984).




Constitutional Rights of Excludable Aliens
State action which seeks to protect participation in the political pro-
cesses can be analogized to federal action which falls within the scope of
the government's plenary power over immigration as defined by the Wong
Wing framework. In both situations, the respective government seeks to
further a fundamental interest. The state seeks to protect its democratic
functions, and the federal government seeks to protect national borders.
Like state action that seeks to protect political processes, federal action
falling within the core of the government's immigration authority should be
subject to a standard of mere rationality. 125
In determining the level of heightened scrutiny that should be applied to
federal actions beyond the scope of the government's plenary power under
the Wong Wing framework, an analogy to state cases continues to be
instructive. Initially, it appeared that whenever states discriminated against
aliens in areas other than the protection of their political processes, the
Court would apply strict scrutiny. 126 However, in Plyler v. Doe, 127 the
Court made clear that it would not automatically apply strict scrutiny to all
classifications based on alienage. Rather, the Court would evaluate the
precise classification involved and the interest or right that was affected in
determining the appropriate level of review.
In asserting that undocumented aliens should not be considered a "sus-
pect" class, the Plyler Court found two factors to be relevant. First, the fact
that the presence of undocumented aliens in this country had been procured
illegally could not be considered a "constitutional irrelevancy. " 128 Second,
the Court found it significant that entrance into the class of undocumented
aliens is a "voluntary action."' 129 However, the Court also deemed a
rational basis test to be inappropriate because, although the action of adults
entering this country was voluntary, the action of their children was not.
125. Actions that fall within the scope of the government's plenary power according to the Wong
Wing framework, and therefore are subject to a standard of mere rationality, include: (1) substantive
determinations regarding who may enter or remain in the United States, (2) the ability to deport aliens
who fail to meet those substantive requirements, and (3) the ability to detain aliens temporarily where
necessary to effect their deportation. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
126. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), was the first Supreme Court decision to apply a level of
scrutiny lower than strict when a state acted to discriminate against aliens in an area outside its interest
in protecting political participation.
127. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Plyler involved a Texas statute which denied local school districts the
use of state funds for the education of children of illegal aliens and permitted public schools to deny
enrollment to the children as well. Id. at 205.
128. Id. at 219 n.19, 223.
129. Id. at 219 n.19, 220. Although the illegality of undocumented aliens' presence in the United
States may indeed have some "constitutional relevancy" regarding the level of scrutiny the Court
should apply, it is unclear how the voluntariness of their entrance into the class of undocumented aliens
distinguishes them from the resident aliens in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The
entrance of individuals into the class of resident aliens is equally voluntary; nevertheless, the resident
alien class remains subject to strict judicial review.
1469
Washington Law Review
The Court found that punishing the child for the parent's misconduct "does
not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice."' 130
After evaluating the classification involved, the Plyler Court examined
the interest or right affected by the government's action. The Court did not
consider education to be a fundamental right that would trigger strict
scrutiny. 131 However, the Court did consider education to be more impor-
tant than other social welfare benefits. 132 Taking into consideration all these
factors, the Court rejected both the standards of mere rationality and strict
scrutiny and applied an intermediate level of review. 133
The Plyler Court's method of determining the appropriate level of
judicial scrutiny by closely evaluating both the government classification
involved and the individual right or interest that is affected should be
applied to federal immigration actions which fall outside the scope of the
government's plenary power. A blanket application of strict scrutiny would
have the practical effect of precluding the government from ever acting
beyond the core of its immigration authority. However, the intent behind the
Wong Wing framework is not to completely disable the government from
acting beyond the core actions within its plenary power. Rather, the intent
of the framework is to bring those actions, unlike actions within the scope
of the government's plenary power, within the ambit of the Court's height-
ened judicial scrutiny. 134
B. Constitutional Limitations on Actions Within the Scope of the
Government's Plenary Power: The Japanese Immigrant Case
Although the Supreme Court had provided a framework for defining the
scope of the government's plenary power over immigration in Wong Wing,
the existence of any constitutional limitations on the government when it
acted within the core of its plenary power remained unclear. Any confusion
that may have persisted should have been resolved by the Court's decision
in Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case). 135 However,
like Wong Wing, the Japanese Immigrant Case typically has been construed
too narrowly. 136
130. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20.
131. Id. at 223.
132. Idat 221.
133. Id. at 223-24.
134. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
135. 189 U.S. 86 (1903). The Japanese Immigrant Case involved an attempt by the government to
deport an alien on the ground "that she was a pauper and likely to become a public charge." Id. at 87.
Kaoru Yamataya claimed that the administrative hearing which determined her right to remain in the
United States was inadequate and a denial of due process. Id. at 88.
136. The Supreme Court has construed the Japanese Immigrant Case as standing for the narrow
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1. Due Process and the Government's Plenary Power Over
Immigration
Although the Japanese Immigrant Case has been traditionally viewed as
applying only to cases of deportation, the Court's analysis makes clear that
much of what is said in that decision applies with equal force in both deporta-
tion and exclusion settings. 137 In Shaughnessy v. UnitedStates ex rel. Mezei,
the Court cited the Japanese Immigrant Case as standing for the narrow
proposition that an alien who had entered the country could not be deported
without due process of law. 138 As such, the decision applies only to deporta-
ble aliens and offers little, if any, assistance to the excludable alien. However,
the Mezei Court failed to recognize the broader holding of the Japanese
Immigrant Case that applies to government action toward both deportable
and excludable aliens: that whenever government officials, acting within the
scope of their authority, carry outprovisions of a statute that affect the liberty
of individuals, they must abide by the principles embodied in due process. 139
The Court firmly declared that it had never held otherwise: "[T]his court has
never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative
officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of
persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due pro-
cess of law'. . ."140 Therefore, the excludable alien is entitled to due
process if the government's action, whether within the scope of its plenary
authority or not, implicates a liberty interest of the alien. 141
proposition that deportable aliens must be ensured due process in any determination of their right to
remain in this country. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 33; Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302,315
(1955) (Black, J., dissenting); Shaughnessy v. United States exrel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,771(1950); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160,181(1948) (Black,
J., dissenting).
137. The Court first reasserted the identity of the powers to exclude and expel. It stated that both
powers belonged to the political branches of the government and that the judiciary was limited in its
ability to review government decisions in either realm. Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100.
However, after affirming the existence of and connection between the two powers, the Court held that
notwithstanding the government's broad authority over both exclusion and expulsion, administrative
officers, acting within the scope of their immigration authority, must act in accord with due process
when their actions impact the liberty of individuals. Id. Therefore, when read in context, the holding
clearly applied to both the deportation and the exclusion power.
138. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.
139. See Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 100.
140. Id.
141. When viewed in light of the two-part test advocated by this Comment, the Japanese Immigrant
Case reconciles the apparent inconsistency between granting the government plenary power over depor-
tation, on the one hand, yet holding that an alien subject to deportation must be granted procedural due
process rights priorto deportation, on the other. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. Although
deportation falls within the scope of the government's plenary power as defined by Wong Wing under the
first prong of the proposed test, deportation also affects a liberty interest of the alien, and therefore, is




2. Does Detention by the INS Violate a "Liberty" Interest of the Fifth
Amendment?
If excludable aliens are entitled to due process when the government's
action impacts their liberty, then the next analytical step is to determine
whether the detention of excludable aliens by the INS implicates a liberty
interest. 142 In Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 143 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that the temporary detention of an alien
pending deportation does not constitute a deprivation of liberty in violation
of the fifth amendment. This determination was based on the judiciary's
characterization of deportation as a civil rather than a penal action, and on
the fiction that temporary detention is merely an extension of exclusion or
expulsion. 144 However, the court distinguished between the typical deten-
tion of excludable aliens, which is of short duration pending prompt
deportation, and detention that continues for many months or years because
deportation has become impossible. 145 The court went on to indicate that
the prolonged detention experienced by Cuban refugees was of a funda-
mentally different nature than the temporary detention approved by the
judiciary. The court drew an analogy between detention pending deporta-
tion and incarceration pending trial. Both were justifiable only as neces-
sary, temporary measures. 146 The Tenth Circuit noted that incarceration
pending trial would acquire a new, unauthorized character if there was to be
no trial; 147 the same would be true of an alien's detention where deportation
could not be accomplished. The court properly considered this type of
detention to be a deprivation of liberty under the fifth amendment. 148
142. In the Japanese Immigrant Case the Court did not provide a list of which immigration actions
implicate an alien's personal liberty. The only immigration action considered by the Court was that of
deportation. The Court ruled that deportation did impact an alien's liberty interest. Therefore, an alien
must be assured due process protections regarding his or her right to remain in the United States.
Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. at 101. However, the Court did not touch upon whether decisions to
exclude or detain implicate a liberty interest. Whether the decision to exclude involves a liberty interest
is beyond the scope of this Comment. The central issue involving Cuban and Haitian refugees is not the
validity of their exclusion, but rather the validity of their detention. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct.
2992, 2995 (1985) (question of exclusion was unchallenged because determinations regarding the
admissibility of the Haitian petitioners were still pending); Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 654
F.2d 1382, 1386 n.2 (10th Cir. 1981) (Cuban petitioners do not challenge order of exclusion).
143. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
144. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 654 F.2d at 1382. Although the Court in Rodriguez-Fernandez dis-
cussed the constitutionality of the detention of Cuban refugees in depth, the discussion was dictum
because the court had disposed of the appeal by construing applicable statutes to require the release of
the aliens. Id. at 1386.
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3. What Process Is Due?
Once it is determined that a liberty interest has been affected by the
government's action, the next issue to address is the types of procedural
protections that are due the alien. The Court has recognized that due
process is a flexible concept, adapting and changing according to the
particular dictates of time, place, and circumstances. 149 In Mathews v.
Eldridge, 150 the Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to determine
the necessary contours of due process in various situations. According to
the Eldridge test, a procedural safeguard to which the petitioner claims
entitlement will only be granted if the government's interest in the chal-
lenged action is outweighed by: (1) the petitioner's interest in the outcome
of the government's decision, and (2) the likelihood that different or
additional procedures would reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
the petitioner's interest. 151
C. Applying the Two-Part Test to the Haitian and Cuban Situations
Applying the principles derived from Wong Wing and the Japanese
Immigrant Case involves a two-step process. The first step is to determine
whether the government's action is within the scope of its authority over
excludable aliens according to the framework derived from Wong Wing. If
the action does not fall within the core of the government's plenary
exclusion authority, it is subject to judicial review and possible limita-
tion. 152 If the action falls within the core of this authority, it is normally
subject to minimal judicial review or the rational relation test. The second
step of the process is to determine whether the government's action impli-
cates a liberty interest of the alien. The Japanese Immigrant Case requires
the government to act in accord with the principles of due process if its
actions implicate an alien's liberty interest, regardless of whether the action
falls within the core of the government's plenary authority or not. 153 This is
the only exception to minimal judicial review where the government's
action falls within the core of its plenary power.
149. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
150. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
151. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. The government's interests include minimizing the fiscal and
administrative costs of granting the additional procedures. Id.
See Comment, supra note 56, at 1327, arguing similarly that the Eldridge test should be applied to
determine the process due to Cuban detainees.
152. See supra notes 83-134 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of Wong
Wing's portion of the proposed test.
153. See supra notes 135-51 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of theJapanese
Immigrant Case portion of the proposed test.
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The Haitians, awaiting determination of their admissibility, allege that
the government is discriminating against them by incarcerating them and
denying parole based solely on their race and national origin. 154 Applying
racially discriminatory standards to the determination of whether Haitians
should be detained or paroled is not an action that falls within the narrow
scope of the government's plenary power according to the Wong Wing
framework. 155 This is true whether the regulations are discriminatory on
their face or facially neutral but applied in a discriminatory manner.
Detention that is based solely on race or nationality is not necessary to
effect exclusion. The relationship, if any, between race and the necessity of
temporary detention is too tenuous to fall within the realm of the govern-
ment's plenary power. Therefore, under the first prong of the proposed test
the government's action would be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.
The precise level of scrutiny that is appropriate regarding the govern-
ment's actions toward Haitian refugees is determined, according to Plyler,
by examining the particular government classification involved and the
individual right or interest that is affected. 156 The class implicated by this
government action involves excludable aliens who are Haitians. The fact
that the class involves alienage should not, in and of itself, result in strict
scrutiny. ' 57 However, the class also involves discrimination based on race
and nationality. Classes based on race or nationality are inherently suspect
and typically subject to strict scrutiny. 158
The interest or right that is implicated by the decision to detain or parole
is the alien's desire to be free from restraint. Temporary detention does not
impinge upon the alien's fundamental right to liberty. 159 However, freedom
from even temporary detention, particularly where it is imposed due to race
or nationality, is a significant interest.1 60 In light of these factors, the
154. See Jean v. Nelson, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 2995 (1985). In Jean, the Supreme Court disposed of the
detention issue by ruling that the INS regulations were facially neutral, and therefore, did not permit
discrimination in a parole determination. Id. at 2998-99. The Supreme Court remanded the case to
determine whether the neutral regulations were being enforced in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 2999.
155. See supra note 125.
156. See supra notes 111-34 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of how the
appropriate level of scrutiny is determined.
157. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
158. The "suspect" classification doctrine was first enunciated by the Court in Korematsu v.
United States (The Japanese Exclusion Case), 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court stated that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect ...
[Clourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify
the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can." Id. at 216. See also Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), where the Court held that racial classifications are constitutionally suspect under
equal protection and due process rights of the fifth amendment.
159. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
160. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Court similarly determined that although education
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government's action should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. If the
Haitians can establish that the government is intentionally acting in a
racially discriminatory manner, then the government would have to prove a
compelling interest in continuing the racial discrimination to maintain the
Haitians' detention.
The Cuban situation is somewhat different. The Cubans do not allege
that the government has incarcerated them because of their race or national
origin. The government has detained them for a variety of arguably legiti-
mate reasons pending the determination of their admissibility or their
deportation.16 This type of action, detention or temporary confinement,
was expressly approved in Wong Wing as a means necessary to give effect to
statutory provisions requiring the exclusion or expulsion of aliens. 162 In this
situation, the government's action in detaining Cuban refugees appears to
fall within the scope of its exclusion authority. However, historical and
diplomatic circumstances have made the detention of many Cubans some-
thing more than temporary. There is no way of knowing when, if ever, their
detention will end. 163 Potentially permanent imprisonment without judicial
trial or even the accusation of a crime implicates an individual's liberty
interest. 164 According to the Japanese Immigrant Case, where liberty is
implicated, the alien must be given due process protections.
What those due process protections entail should be determined accord-
ing to the balancing test enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.165 There are
several interests to be considered on the government's side of the Eldridge
equation. First, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the government
has a strong interest in determining the admissibility of entrant aliens. 166
However, in this particular case, the challenge does not involve the govern-
ment's decision that the Cuban refugees are inadmissible, but rather touches
solely upon the government's decision to incarcerate these aliens. 167
was not a fundamental right, it was an important interest that weighed in favor of heightened scrutiny.
See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
161. The government's reasons for holding the Cubans vary widely: some have been convicted of
crimes in the United States ranging from minor infractions to serious offenses; others have violated the
immigration laws. Many of the Cubans have completed their sentences for the crimes they committed,
but have continued to be incarcerated. There are other Cubans, however, who have committed no crimes
in the United States, but were detained immediately upon their arrival more than six years ago. They
were detained for a variety of reasons. For example, some were believed to have been convicted of
crimes in Cuba, or to be mentally incompetent. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at Al-col. 1.
162. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).
163. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
165. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
166. See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 657, 659 (1892) (national self-preservation requires that
sovereign nations possess the power to prohibit the entrance of aliens).
167. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1386 n.2 (10th Cir. 1981).
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Second, the government has an interest in being able to deport those
aliens found to be excludable as quickly as possible. To the extent that
temporary detention hastens that process, the government has a strong
interest in being able to detain excludable aliens. However, in this instance
the government cannot claim an interest in speedy deportation procedures
because the Cubans cannot be deported. 168
Third, the government has an interest in detaining those aliens who pose
serious risks to our society, whether or not deportation is feasible.
169
However, the government has a countervailing interest in not detaining any
Cuban based on an erroneous determination of the alien's potential threat to
society. 170 This interest is based on two considerations. First, there is a
strong economic incentive to minimize the substantial costs of incarcerat-
ing aliens who do not realistically pose a threat to society. 17 Second, the
government has an interest in protecting the fundamental principles upon
which this country was founded, and in applying them in a consistent
manner to all persons. 172 When fundamental values, such as a person's
inalienable right to liberty, are ignored with regard to the treatment of
certain groups or individuals, society as a whole suffers because the
fundamental values which protect the liberty of everyone are under-
mined. 173
Finally, the Eldridge test recognizes that the government has an interest
in minimizing the fiscal and administrative burdens that result from added
procedures. However, with regard to the Cubans, the government has little
argument against added procedures due to higher administrative costs,
because it is apparently willing to spend substantial sums incarcerating
168. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
169. Comment, supra note 56, at 1327-28. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1133
(N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (1lth Cir. 1984).
Contrary to the arguments advanced in this Comment, the Eleventh Circuit found Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), to be controlling in Fernandez-Roque and reversed
the district court's determination that where refugees are indefinitely incarcerated a liberty interest
arises. However, this Comment has rejected Mezei, and therefore the Eleventh Circuit's analysis.
Furthermore, the appellate ruling does not reflect upon the district court's analysis of the Eldridge test,
or its analysis of the process that would be due to the Cuban refugees were a liberty interest to be found.
170. Fernandez-Roque, 567 F. Supp. at 1134.
171. Id.
172. Id. The district court apparently equated the interests of the government with the interests of
society. The court referred to "governmental" and "societal interests" interchangeably. Id. at 1133-34.
Arguably, the interests of the government and society could be quite different. However, in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Supreme Court also indicates the social interests are to be imputed to
the government by using the terms "government interest," id. at 335, and "public interest," id. at 347,
interchangeably.
173. Fernandez-Roque, 567 F. Supp. at 1134. See Shaughnessy v. United States exrel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206,217 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting) ("No society is free where government makes one person's
liberty depend upon the arbitrary will of another.").
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these individuals for the rest of their lives. 174 In fact, by granting additional
due process procedures, the government may actually save money because
it will no longer have to bear the extraordinary costs of improperly im-
prisoning these individuals. 175
On the Cubans' side of the Eldridge equation is a substantial interest in
freedom from arbitrary incarceration. 176 The right to be free from im-
prisonment without the protections of judicial process is fundamental. 177
Many of the Cuban refugees have already spent long periods of time in
federal prisons and face the real possibility of spending the rest of their lives
behind bars. 178 The categorization of this type of treatment as civil rather
than penal begins to wear thin under these circumstances. 179 This is the type
of punishment that our society reserves for its most heinous felons. 180
Because the government's interest in summary proceedings involving the
Cuban refugees is limited, and because the practical effect of the treatment
the Cubans have received is analogous to criminal punishment, substantial
procedural protections should be granted to the Cuban refugees. 181
174. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
175. Fernandez-Roque, 567 F. Supp. at 1115, 1134 n.6.
176. Id., at 1128, 1133. See Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (freedom from bodily restraint is fundamental to the liberty
interests that are protected by due process).
See Comment, supra note 56, at 1327-28, also arguing that an excludable alien's interest in freedom
from arbitrary incarceration must be balanced in the Eldridge test.
177. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (it is a fundamental constitutional principle
that a government may not hold and physically punish a person without due process).
178. Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 645 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981). See also N.Y.
Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 1; A13, col. 5. Several hundred of the Cuban refugees have been held
for up to six years. Most of the Cuban refugees are being held in federal penitentiaries where conditions
of overcrowding and violence are severe. Id.
179. Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("The legal fiction
that an excludable is 'waiting at the border' wears quite thin after a year at the Atlanta Federal
Penitentiary.").
180. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 (1981).
181. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F Supp. 1115, 1128, 1131 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd, 734
F.2d 576 (1 th Cir. 1984), for a detailed explanation by the trial court of the procedural protections that
should be granted to Cuban refugees under the Eldridge test. See supra note 169, explaining that the
Eleventh Circuit's reversal does not implicate the district court's analysis of the Eldridge test.
The district court mandated a substantial list of procedural protections, including: (1) prior written
notice of the factual allegations supporting detention, and access to underlying evidence possessed by
the government, Fernandez-Roque, 567 F.Supp. at 1134-35; (2) the right to present documentary
evidence and compel the attendance of witnesses, id. at 1135-36; (3) the right to confrontation and cross
examination of witnesses, id. at 1136; (4) a neutral hearing body whose determination is based
exclusively on evidence produced at the hearing and whose determination is not reviewable by other
government officials, id.; (5) a written statement of the reasons for the hearing officer's determination,
id.; (6) protections against self-incrimination, id. at 1137; (7) the right to counsel provided at
government expense where necessary, id. at 1138-39; and finally, (8) a requirement that the government
bear the burden of proving that the alien is likely to abscond, is a risk to national security, or is a serious




The idea that the powers of government should be carefully constrained
to protect human rights and liberty is a cornerstone upon which the political
traditions of this nation have been built. The concept is fundamental to the
structure of our society. Therefore, it is shocking to find people in this
country who have been excluded from that tradition and left with little
protection against the exercise of governmental power. This is the situation
faced by many Cuban and Haitian refugees. As excludable aliens, they are
subject to nearly unlimited governmental authority. Yet, it has not always
been so. Early in this century, the Supreme Court had begun to grant
excludable aliens protections against the excesses of government power.
Two decisions in particular, Wong Wing and the Japanese Immigrant Case,
provide a structure for defining the extent of the government's authority and
the rights that excludable aliens may claim. It is time to return to those
earlier authorities and bring excludable aliens into the mainstream of this
country's traditions. Sometimes, a step backward is progress.
Tamara J. Conrad
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